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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL K. MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY 
OF OGDEN, a corporation, and SAFE-
WAY STORES, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 9161 
PRELI~fiNARY STATE1fENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from an Order Granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment in favor of defendant, Safeway 
Stores, Inc., signed October 22, 1959 (R. 17), and a 
Judgment of Non-Suit for Defendant, Coca Cola Bottling 
Company of Ogden, signed on October 26, 1959 (R. 20). 
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The Motions were made by respective counsel for both 
defendants at pretrial of this law suit. Said Motions were 
granted by the pretrial judge based on the pleadings and 
the deposition of the plaintiff (R. 16). 
The incident out of which this action arose, occurred 
at plaintiff's home at 1373 Fifth Street, Ogden, Utah, at 
approximately 8:30 o'clock P.M. on the 31st day of J\Iarch, 
1959. At the time in question the plaintiff opened a bottle 
of Coca Cola and while taking a drink from said bottle 
a square paper clip came from said bottle and lodged 
in his windpipe, thereby causing the damages of which 
plaintiff complains (R. 1). 
Plaintiff purchased the bottle in question at a store 
of defendant, Safeway Stores, Inc., located on 24th Street, 
above Monroe Avenue in Ogden, rtah, a few days prior to 
February 27, 1959, when he purchased two cartons of 
six bottles, these being the smaller size bottles (plaintiff's 
deposition pp. 12-15). Said bottle had been manufactured 
and prepared by defendant, Coca Cola Bottling Company 
of Ogden, as alleged in plaintiff's Cmnplaint and as 
shown by the Coc.a Cola bottle cap placed in evidence at 
the deposition (R. 2 and Exhibit-± plaintiff's deposition). 
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the two 
e.artons of Coca Cola were kept in a fruit room which 
opens frorn the attached garage and is next to the kitchen. 
II e further testified that the bottle in question ·was the 
last of the two cartons. On the night in question, at ap-
proximately S :30 o~elork P.~L, he took a shower and pre-
pared himself for bed and then opened the bottle in ques-
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3 
tion and had drunk about half of it when the paper clip 
lodged in his throat (plaintiff's Deposition pp. 8, 10, 11 
and Exhibit 1). Plaintiff testified that whenever he and 
his wife are both out of the house the garage door is kept 
locked (plaintiff's Deposition p. 12). Plaintiff would 
testify at trial, if given an opportunity, that when he 
opened the bottle of Coca Cola it popped and fizzed. 
After plaintiff was taken to the hospital, the bottle 
rn (1uestion was exarnined and another paper clip was 
found in the bottom (Exhibit 3 plaintiff's deposition). 
In addition to this, plaintiff testified that x-rays taken 
at the hospital showed a paper clip in his stomach (plain-
tiff's deposition p. 9). I-Ie also testified that an x-ray 
.taken the next day shovved that the paper clip had entered 
the big colon. 
Plaintiff also testified that there were no such paper 
clips as the clips in question around his house and that 
he had no connection with any such clips in his business 
(pp. 24 and 25 plaintiff's deposition). In addition to this 
plaintiff testified that he used a combination beer can 
bottle opener to open the bottle in question (p. 11 plain-
tiff's deposition). If given the opportunity, plaintiff 
could produce the opener which was used and an examina-
tion of the opener together with the bottle cap in evidence 
"·ould show that the indentation fits exactly. It can easily 
hr seen frmn an examination of the bottle cap that there 
:'ere no other n1arks than the one made by the bottle 
opener. 
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4 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint against both the Coca 
Cola Bottling Company of Ogden, the manufacturer, and 
Safeway Stores, Inc., the retailer. 
Three legal theories of recovery were alleged in the 
Complaint against both defendants. Plaintiff alleged, 
first, that both defendants violated the statutes of Utah, 
Section 5, Chapter 20, Title 4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 in manufacturing for sale and selling a bottle of 
Coca Cola which was adulterated by having in it foreign 
articles, to-wit: paper clips. 
Next, plaintiff alleged that both defendants impliedly 
warranted to plaintiff when plaintiff purchased the said 
bottle of Coca Cola that said bottle of Coca Cola was fit 
for the use intended and that it was of merchantable 
quality; and further that both defendants breached said 
implied warranty in that said bottle of Coca Cola was not 
fit for the use intended and was not of Inerchantable 
quality. 
In addition to this, plaintiff alleged that both de-
fendants were negligent and that an inference of negli-
gence arises from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (R. 
1, 2 and 3). 
A Notice of Readiness was filed and pretrial was 
held on October 21, 1959. Counsel for plaintiff was not 
prPsent at this pretrial (nothing is clain1ed by reason 
of this). At pretrial, both defendants Inade l\fotions for 
Summary Judg1nent which were granted. When counsel 
for plaintiff picked up his copy of the Pretrial OrdBr and 
discovered that these Motions had been 1nade and grant-
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5 
ed, he made inquiry from the pretrial judge as to the 
reasons said Motions were granted. He was informed 
generally that they were granted as to the negligence 
issue on the basis of the Jordan case, the warranty issue 
on the basis of the Sales Act and the statutory violation 
issue on the basis of the Niemann case. From these Suln-
mary Dismissals the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal and 
the Designation of Record on Appeal, defendant Safeway 
Stores, Inc., filed a motion to attach to the record a 
"·Continuing Cmnmodity Guaranty" for the reason that 
this agreement was discussed at pretrial and through 
oversight was not offered into evidence. The court al-
lowed this agreen1ent between the two defendants to be 
admitted in evidence and attached to the record, and 
counsel for plaintiff stated his objection to this procedure 
for the reason that any agreement between the two tort-
feasors could not possibly affect the rights of an injured 
party injured because of said defendants' negligence, 
breach of warranty and statutory violation (R. 22 and 
23). 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF 
FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY. 
POINT II. 
AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EXISTS AGAINST 
BOTH DEFENDANTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
IPSA LOQUITUR. 
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POIN'T III. 
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF 
BY REASON OF VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STAT-
UTES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF 
FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY. 
A. FOUNDATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
1. ·COMMON LAW 
The special obligation of warranty in the sale of food 
arose at common law at an early date as an action on the 
case and was a tort action in the nature of deceit. It has 
been pointed out that this special obligation was in exist-
ence before the action of special assumpsit on which 
1nodern contract law is based. It should be pointed out 
that jurisdictions in the United States which do not have 
the Uniform Sales Act allow actions on in1plied warranty 
in food cases based on the old comn1on la·w. See Willis-
ton on Sales, \T ol. I, Sections :2±1 and :2-1::2 ; Decker and 
Sons Inc. cs. Capps, et al., 1942, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.\V. 
2d 8:2S; Parish v. Great AtlaJZtic & Pacific Tea Co., ~fun. 
( ~t. 1958, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7. 
2. SALES ACT 
Jfost jurisdictions in the rnited States, as does rtah, 
operate under the provisions of the Unifonn Sales Act. 
Ln speaking of the origin of the Sales Act. Professor 
Williston states in his work on sales, Yol. I. Paragraph 
24R at Page 659 : 
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"In the preceding sections nun1erous decision~ 
under the Sales Act have indicated its effect on 
previously existing Common law, but a brief 
sun1mary may still be pertinent. 
"The provisions of the Sales Act on warranty 
were copied in substance frmn the English stat-
ute and that statute was intended to express tlw 
cmnmon law of England as it existed at the tinw 
the act was passed. It rnay, therefore, be supposed 
that the liability of a seller under the Sales Act 
vvill be somewhat greater than that imposed by 
the conrmon law of many jurisdictions of tht> 
United States." 
The part of the Sales Act which applies to the case 
at bar is contained in Section G0-1-15, 1Jtah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, and reads as follows: 
"Irnplied warranties of quality. - Subject 
to the provisions of this title and of any statute 
in that behalf, there is no irnplied warranty or 
condition as to the qualit:T or fitness for any par-
ticular purpose of goods supplied under a con-
tract to sell or a sale, except as follows: 
(1) \Vhere the buyer, expressly or by inrpli-
cation, rnakes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required, and it 
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill 
or judgrnent (whether he is the grower or manu-
facturer or not), there is an implied warranty 
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such 
purpose. 
( 2) Where the goods are bought by de-
scription frorn a seller who deals in goods of that 
description (whether he is the grower or manu-
facturer or not), there is an implied warranty that 
the goods shall be of rnerchantable quality.'' 
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Generally speaking, food cases 1nerely refer to an 
implied warranty of wholesomeness of food or words to 
that effect without specifying whether the warranty 
comes into operation under subdivision 1 or subdivision 
2 of the aforesaid statute. This practice is summarized 
by Reed Dickerson in his comprehensive work, "Products 
LiabiliJty and the Food Consumer," 1951, in Paragraph 
1.19 at Page 60: 
"In practice, there is a strong tendency to 
assume that Sections 15 (1) and 15 (2), taken 
together, raise a warranty of wholesomeness in 
all retail food sales. Whatever may be true of 
other commodities, the jigsaw puzzle of the Uni-
form Sales Act, as pieced together in many states, 
spells out in consumer food cases a liability in 
warranty as strict as that existing under the spe-
cial common law warranty peculiar to food." 
And, as was pointed out by Justice Stephens in his 
memorable decision in the case of Cushing v. Rodman, 
OCA D.C. 1936, 82 F. 2d 86-± in footnote 1 at Page 864: 
"In this case, w·e speak in terms of implied 
warranty of wholesmneness. As pointed out in 
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, cit. infra, 
there are tin1es ·when an ilnplied warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose has no relation to an 
implied warranty of nwrchantable quality; but in 
the case of foods, the distinction between the two 
warranties is unilnportant, for whether or not 
there is an i1nplied warranty that the goods are 
fit for the purpose of human consun1ption, there 
is an ilnplied warranty that the~r are of merchant-
able quality; and food which is unfit for human 
consumption does not satisfy this warranty." 
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~~ The situation existing in the ordinary retail sale as 
~~~ held to be under subdivision 1 aforesaid has been well 
stated in the case of Rinaldi v .. ZJ!I ohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 
73, 121 N.E. 471, 472: 
"We think that the mere purchase by a custo-
mer from a retail dealer in foods of an article 
ordinarily used for human consumption does by 
implication make known to the vendor the pur-
pose for which the article is required. Such a 
transaction standing by itself permits no contrary 
inferences. In this we agree with the courts of 
Massachusetts. But we think, further, that such a 
purchase where the buyer may assume that the 
seller has the opportunity to examine the article 
sold, unexplained, is also conclusive evidence of 
reliance on the seller's skill or judgment." 
Also it is stated at Page 57 of Reed Dickerson's 
"Products Liability and the Food Consumer": 
"It is generally agreed that a purchase by 
trade name is a purchase by description within the 
meaning of Section 15 ( 2), which gives the buyer 
the protection of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability.'' 
Also see Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1952, 329 
:Mass. 440, 108 N.E. 2d 757, where it was held that a pur-
chase of Coca Cola from a vending machine was a sale 
of goods by description and that there was no essential 
difference in this method and in the method used in self 
service stores and that there accordingly was an implied 
warranty of merchantability under subsection 2 afore-
said. Furthermore, it appears that some states have im-
posed a warranty of wholesomeness on food products a::-: 
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a 1natter of public policy separate and apart frmn the 
Sales Act. In this regard, note particularly cases herein-
after cited from the states of Washington, Texas and 
.:\1issouri. 
B. AS AGAINST RETAILER 
The general state1nent of the law in regard to inl-
plied warranty liability as against a retailer dealing in 
sealed goods is stated in Harper and James, ''The Law 
of Torts," 1956, ·vol. 2 at Page 1599 as follows: 
"The principal controversy concerning the 
retailer's liability rages over the question whether 
or not he warrants the fitness of products ob-
tained from reputable suppliers and sold in their 
containers under circumstances where the buyer 
realizes that his seller could not and did not 
inspect the contents of the container. Probably 
the 1najority of American courts (both at common 
law and under the Sales Act) now hold the 
retailer strictly on his warranty. * * * 
The argument for the prevailing view points 
to the strict nature of warranty at common law 
and under the broad tenns of the Sales Act, 
\Vhich certainly do not suggest an exception for 
latent defects. If reliance upon the seller is 
needed, it 1nay be found in the customer's reliance 
on the retailer's skill and judgment in selecting 
his sources of supply. Broader considerations are 
also urged. The retailer should bear this as one 
of the risks of his enterprise. He profits from 
the transaction and is in a fairly strategic posi-
tion to promote safety through pressure on his 
supplier. Also, he is known to his customers and 
subject to their suits, while the 1naker is often 
unknown and may well be beyond the process 
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of any court convenient to the custmner. ~fore­
over, the retailer is in a good position to pass 
the loss back to his supplier, either through ne-
gotiation or through legal proceedings." 
A silnilar statmnent is nmde as to the 1najority 
point of view on this subject in "Prosser on, Torts" 2nd 
l·:dition, 1955, at Page 495. For si1nilar staten1ents as 
to the great weight of authority see 90 ALR 1270} 1272: 
I I arper and ~T mnes "The Lew· of Torts" Y ol. 2, Page 
1599; and 1-1::2 ALR 1439. Also see Burkhardt v. Armo·ur 
& Co., 1932, 115 ·Conn. 2-±9, 1G1 A. 385; Swengel v. F. & 
E. lVlwlesale Grocery Co.} 1938, 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 
930; Food P.air Stores of Florida v. Macurda} 1957, _______ _ 
Fla. ______ , 93 So. 2d fHiO; Sence'r 1'. Carl's JY/arkets} 1950: 
______ Fla. ______ , 45 So. 2d 671; Griggs Canning Co.} et al L 
Josey} 1942, 139 T~x. 623, 16-t S.vV. 835; and 1 "TVillistrm 
o H Sales" Page 637. 
In addition to this, the following cases, led by'Cttsh-
wg 'l'. ll:Jdnuw} CCA D. C. 1936, 82 F. 2d 864, have iln-
posed irnplied warranty liabilit:v on restaurant operator~ 
\\·ho serve food \Yhich cannot be inspected without eating 
and thereby destroying the rnarketability of said food in 
spite of the technical argurnent made by defendants that 
the service of food is not technically a sale: Stanfield L 
F. H'". T:Vool'lcorth Co.} 1936, 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. 2d 878: 
Smith r. Carlos} 1923, 215 ~1o. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468: 
Friend r. Cl1ilds Dinhlg flall Co.} 1918, 231 Mass. 65, 120 
::~.E. -1-01: and Temple r. ]{peler, 192-t 2:1R N.Y. 3++, 14+ 
S.E. 635. 
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In particular the policy statement made in the case 
of Cushing v. Rodman, supra, is recommended to this 
court as a persuasive statement of the policy reasons 
for imposing an implied warranty on a person in the 
same position as a retailer. 
Another statement is made in Harper and James, 
((The Law of Torts," supra, Vol. 2 at Page 1582 which 
appears to cover specifically the situation involved in 
self service stores : 
"Thus, in the everyday situation where the 
customer selects foodstuffs on display in a self-
service supermarket, the weight of authority will 
impose a warranty of fitness whether the product 
is sealed in a can or is open to inspection * * *." 
C. AS AGAINST MANUFACTURER 
The primary problem involved in attaching liability 
to the manufacturer is the claim made by the manu-
facturer that there is no privity of contract between 
the manufacturer and the consumer and, therefore, 
there can be no implied warranty. ~~s will be seen here-
after, there is no historical foundation for this claim and 
there is no sound reason for upholding it. There is a 
growing modern trend of cases which have discarded 
the old privity doctrine by one method or another as 
will be seen hereafter. Some cases have in1posed the 
warranty on a public policy basis; others have held that 
the warranty runs with the product; others have held 
that there is privity; while still others have skirted the 
privity rule by use of the third party beneficiary con-
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cept. There are other cases which have apparently 
ignored or brushed aside the privity concept. 
A good statement of policy as to why, in the public 
interest, warranties should be extended is stated in 
l-Iarper and Jan1es, "The Law of Torts," 1956, Vol. 2 
at Page 1571: 
"But where commodities are dangerous to 
life and health, society's interest transcends that 
of protecting reasonable business expectations. It 
extends to minimizing the danger to consumers 
and putting the burden of their losses on those 
·who best can minimize the danger and distribute 
equitably the losses that do occur. And since the 
warranties involved in these cases do not repre-
sent the expressed or implied-in-fact intent of 
bargainers, but are warranties imposed by law 
as vehicles of social policy, (citing cases), the 
courts should extend them as far as the relevant 
social policy requires. The interest in consumer 
protection calls for warranties by the maker that 
do run with the goods, to reach all who are likely 
to be hurt by the use of the unfit commodity for 
a purpose ordinarily to be expected. 
Several courts have accepted reasoning sub-
stantially like that just set out, although very few 
of the decisions that do so deal with commodities 
other than food. Thus the warranty remedy 
against the maker has been extended to remote 
purchasers and to consumers other than pur-
chasers. (citing cases)" 
One of the leading cases in this field is the case of 
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, et al, 1942, 139 Tex. 609 
164 S.\Y. 2d 828. This ·was a law suit for injuries arising 
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out of consumption of sausage manufactured by the 
defendant and sold to a retail dealer in a cellophane 
package. In discarding the claim of lack of privity as 
a defense, the court imposed an implied warranty by 
operation of law as a matter of "public policy." In re-
viewing the common law the court pointed out that 
the warranty applying to food products arose before 
special assumpsit on which modern contracts law is 
based and that the re1nedy for impure food was an 
action on the case. The court went on to point out that 
the doctrine of privity of contract grew out of special 
assumpsit and therefore there was no historical reason 
for imposing the privity doctrine on food products cases. 
The court went on to hold that regardless of the privity 
doctrine having no historical basis the court was holding 
that there is an i1nplied warranty on food products as 
a Inatter of public policy for the protection of the public 
and that this warranty is not dependent on any pro-
vision of the contract, either expressed or in1plied. The 
court cited nu1nerous cases showing the growing ten-
dency to discard the requiren1ent of privity and to hold 
the manufacturer liable directly to the ultin1ate consumer. 
The case of PariJsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co., Th1:un. Ct. N. Y. 1958, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7, is a case 
in which an exhaustive study was 1nade by the judge 
in regard to the question of privity. The question in-
volved in that case was whether or not a child could 
recover inas1nuch as the child's 1nother was the pur-
chaser of the food in question and the one who had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
privity. Of course, if the privity doctrine is logically 
applied, there are a great many situations which can 
be foreseen where a child or a husband or a friend could 
he denied recovery on this technicality. The scholarly 
opinion of the judge in the Parish case held that there 
\Yas no historical basis for the privity doctrine in the 
food field and that public policy was to protect the 
eonsuming public. and that there was no reason to 
distinguish betv{een a buyer and any other consu1ner. 
rPhe court in ruling in favor of the plaintiff brushed aside 
the privit~, concept on the basis of the third part:v bene-
ficiary concept. 
~Che case of Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. 
Cothey, 1957, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094, is a law su1t 
whic~1 \Yas brought both on implied warranty and res 
ipsa loquitur in a case ·w·here a dead fly was found in 
a bottle of Coca Cola purchased and consumed at a 
drug store. The law suit was filed against the manu-
facturer, and the court held that both theories were 
1naintainable in Arizona. The contention was made in 
that case that there could be no recovery on implied 
warranty because of lack of privity. The court rejected 
this contention citing a modern trend of cases which 
have rejected the privity doctrine as unsound and re-
l~·ing especially on the Capps case, supra. The court 
states at Page 1097: 
"However, an i1nposing group of jurisdic-
tions hold that there is an exception to the general 
rule in the case of manufacturers of food stuffs 
such that an in1plied warranty of fitness inures 
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to the benefit of the ultimate consumer though 
there be no strict privity of contract running 
between the manufacturer and consumer. (citing 
cases) * * * 
We believe that the decisions in the latter 
group of jurisdictions represent the more recent 
trend and provide the better reasoned authority.'' 
The case of Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 1939, 14 
Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799, is a case in which the court 
exploded the privity doctrine as contended for by the 
defendant. That case involved a sandwich made by the 
defendant which contained maggots. The defendant com-
pany made the sandwich in question and wrapped it 
in waxed paper which was sealed by metal clips and 
sold to the retailer. 
In reply to the claim of lack of privity, the court 
stated at Page 804: 
"In adopting the statute here concerned as 
a part of the Uniform Sales _._~ct, it was the clear 
intent of the legislature that, with respect to 
foodstuffs, the implied warranty provision there-
in contained should inure to the benefit of any 
ultimate purchaser or consu1ner of food, and that 
it was not intended that a strict "privity of con-
tract" would be essential for the bringing of an 
action by such ultilnate consun1er for an asserted 
breach of the implied "'\Varranty. 
"Although authorities to the contrary of the 
conclusions herein reached have in1posed a strict 
privity of contract on a purchaser or consumer 
of assertedly unwholesmne food as an essential 
requisite for the bringing of an action on the 
implied warranty theory, nevertheless, the rulings 
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made in the authorities herein cited are based on 
sound principles, affording as they do an ade-
quate remedy for injuries which may result from 
the eating of unwholesome food by an ultimte 
consumer who, under modern economic condi-
tions, almost of necessity, must purchase many 
items of food prepared in original packages by 
the 1nanufacturer and intended for the consuming 
public, although marketed through an intermedi-
ate dealer.'' 
In reaching this conclusion the court cited numerous 
authorities. 
The case of Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., Dec. 6, 1958, 183 Kan. 758, 332 P. 2d 258, is the 
end product of a number of decisions in Kansas which 
have done away ·with any kind of privity requirement 
on the si1nple basis of public policy. This case involved 
drinking part of a bottle of Coca Cola containing a 
foreign substance. The court stated in part, in referring 
to the liability of the n1anufacturer: 
"Where he places such bottled beverage in 
the hands of a dealer for sale, the manufacturer 
is responsible for damages to the consumer, who 
procures such beverage from the dealer and is 
injured by partaking of it. * * * 
The basis for imposing this liability is a 
n1atter of public policy for the protection of the 
people, as discussed in many of our cases. (citing 
cases)" 
Also see Sharp v. The Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottl-ing 
Co., 1957, 180 Kan. 845, 308 P. 2d 150; Simmons v. W~chi­
ta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1957, 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 
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633; and Nichols v. Nold, 1953, 174 Kan. G13, 258 P. 
2d 317. 
The case of LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 
1957, ________ Wash. ________ , 314 P. 2d 421, is a case where 
the court swept aside the claimed defense of lack of 
privity by holding that the implied warranty of the 
wholesomeness of food or beverages in original packages 
placed on sale arises as an implication of the common 
law and that the liability does not rest so rnuch upon 
an irnplied contract as upon a violation of the duty to 
rnernbers of the general public to prevent them from 
suffering injury as a result of the wrongful manufacture 
or distribution of any particular article or articles. The 
court cited the prior Washington case of Mazetti v. 
Armour & Co., 1913, 75 \Vash. 622, 135 P. 633. 
The case of Coca Cola Bottling lVorks v. Lyons, 
1927, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305, dealt with the privity 
question by holding that the irnplied warranty runs with 
the title of the product. 
The Pennsylvania case of N o·ck r. Coca Cola Bottling 
W arks of P-ittsburgh, 1931, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 ~\. 
537, held that when the product is sold in the original 
package, there is privity behveen the rnanufacturer and 
the consumer; and that staternent which appears in 
many of the cases in this field appears in a Missouri 
case, W~lliams v. Coca Cola Bottlimg Co., 1955, ________ Mo. 
··-·----, 285 S.W. 2d 53: at Page 5G: 
"\Ve affirrn the established rule that a manu-
facturer is absolutely liable to the ulthnate con-
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sumer for injuries resulting from the consumption 
of Coca Cola containing i1npure, foreign or de-
leterious substances upon the theory of breech of 
implied warranty of fitness for the purpose of 
human consumption. * * * 
The consumer's remedy should not be made 
to depend upon the "intricacies of the law of 
::;ales," the doctrine of privity of contract, or the 
proof of negligence, nor is this type of case one 
for the application of the co1nmon law doctrine 
of caveat emptor. * * * 
Considerations of public policy, 1nodern 
methods of 1nanufacturing, packaging and mer-
chandising and the protection of the health of 
the consuming public require that an obligation 
be placed upon the 1nanufacturer of Coca Cola 
to see to it, at his peril, that the product he 
offers the public is fit for the purpose for which 
it is intended, namely, human consumption. The 
·'de1nands of social justice" require that his lia-
bility should be made absolute.'' 
lt is sub1nitted that the foregoing authorities are 
representative of the modern trend in establishing ab-
solute liability upon the manufacturer for injuries caused 
by in1pnre food or drink. After all, he is the one who 
is making the profit and who has the ability to take 
~teps to avoid n1arketing bad food products. The con-
suming public, of necessity, must and has to rely on 
the manufacturer to furnish then1 pure food. Certainly, 
all sound reasons of public policy demand that this 
absolute liability be imposed upon the manufacturer 
of foods. 
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POINT II. 
AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EXISTS AGAINST 
BOTH DEFENDANTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Under this point, it is earnestly urged that this court 
reappraise the case of Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Utah, 1950, 117 U. 578, 218 P. 2d 660. It is sub-
mitted that a reappraisal will show that this case should 
be overruled and the law of Utah brought into line ''Tith 
the majority of authority throughout the country in food 
products liability cases. It is respectfully submitted that 
the opinion in the Jordan case is based upon a fanciful 
speculation that there are jokers at large in the cmnmun-
ity going around and tampering with Coca Cola bottles 
at every opportunity. Furthermore, the opinion in the 
Jordan case appears to be based on a false requirement 
that the Coca Cola Bottling Company have exclusive 
control of the bottle at the time the bottle is consumed 
and the deleterious substance discovered. As has been 
pointed out in cases which \Vill be cited herein, the 
requirement of exclusive control is that the bottling 
company have exclusive control at the time the deleteri-
01l.'3 substance is introd1tced into said bottle. Of course, 
this should be a question for the jury to decide, based 
on all the evidence surrounding the incident. 
The opinion in the Jordan case, supra. placed Utah 
behind, in the general trend throughout the county in 
contaminated food and beverage cases. to\vards a re-
laxation of the require1nent of exclusiYe control. See 
/J Utah Lau: Reriezc. 116. This court appeared to follow 
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this trend in the later non food case of Moore v. James, 
1956, 5 U. 2d 91, 297 P 221, where an innkeeper was 
held to have exclusive control of the bathtub and sup-
porting legs while being used by a guest. 
If, based on the evidence, the jury decides that there 
has been no tampering, then certainly the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur should apply. For the court to rule 
out res ipsa loquitur as a matter of law is, in essence, 
the court deciding the issue on a "possibility." This 
court has ruled in the ease of Moore v. D. & R. G. W., 
1956, -! U. 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849, that "possibilities" 
cannot be given to the jury. 
In the case at bar, as has been pointed out in the 
statement of facts herein, credible evidence could and 
would be introduced to make a prima facie showing 
that there had been no tampering with the bottle in 
question. The plaintiff in the case at bar would testify, 
given an opportunity, that the bottle was hard to open 
and that when opened, it popped and fizzed. Also, the 
mere examination of the bottle cap would show that 
there are no other 1narks other than the one which fits 
exactly the bottle opener which was used. Certainly, 
the mere fact that the bottle was kept in plaintiff's 
fruit room and that, conceivably a burglar could burglar-
ize plaintiff's home and do nothing except either ex-
change the bottle for another one or tamper with the 
one which was there, should not prevent the jury from 
taking a common sense approach to the evidence in 
the case. 
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The case of Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. L 
Cathey, 1957, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094, appears to 
be squarely in point as to this issue. In regard to the 
res ipsa loquitur allegation, dealing ·with a situation 
where the plaintiff purchased a bottle of Coca Cola in 
a drug store and found a dead fly in the bottle and 
was suing the bottling company, the court referred to 
the four classifications set forth in the case of Coca 
Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 15~ 
S.W. 2d 721. These are the same four classification~ 
which this court referred to in the Jordan case in 
citing the Sullivan case. 
In referring to the fourth classification where the 
article passes through intennediate hands, the court 
stated at page 1098: 
"In adopting this classification we expand it 
in one respect. We hold that in this fourth clas,;; 
of case in order to satisfy the exclusive control 
requisite of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the 
plaintiff 1nust either prove ''that there has been 
no reasonable opportunity for tmnpering'' or 
that there \\'as no ta1npering "with the bottle, or 
it contents, in the interin1 betw·een the physical 
control of the bottler or manufacturer, and that 
of the consmner.'' r.-Chis is a question of fact which 
the plaintiff 1nay prove by circtunstantial evi-
dence for subn1ission to the jury under proper 
instructions. In the instant ease the court in-
structed the jury that in order for the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine to apply, they nn1st determine 
that the fly did not get into the bottle as a result 
of the intervening act of a third part:, and that 
the condition of the bottle ·wa8 the smne when it 
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left the defendant bottling company's control as 
when it was received by the plaintiff. We believe 
that the jury might reasonably have decided that 
under the circumstances there was no tampering 
with the bottle after it left the bottler's control. 
To decide that there was a tan1pering would re-
quire the jury to believe in this case that a 
person would go unobserved to the cooler behind 
the counter in a drugstore or the druggist or 
one of his employees would go to the cooler and 
place therein a bottle of Coca Cola in which he 
had put a fly by removing and replacing the cap 
and this without being able to foretell who might 
be served that bottle or when it might be served. 
This, we submit, is too far-fetched for reasonable 
men to consider seriously. .;;. * * The trial judge 
placed the question of whether res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine applied properly before the jury on 
c.ircumstantial evidence which might well justify 
a finding by the jury that it did apply." 
There ·was a sin1ilar holding in the case of Ruther-
ford r. Huntington Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1957, _______ _ 
\V. Va. ________ , 97 S.E. 2d 803. In this case the action was 
for injuries caused by glass in a bottle of Coca Cola 
which plaintiff obtained from a vending machine. The 
eourt held that res ipsa loquitur was proper in this 
ease and stated at Page 809: 
"There is no evidence in this case from which 
the jury could conclude that it was more likely 
that smne evilly disposed person took the cap 
off the bottle of Coca Cola, from which the plain-
tiff later drank, inserted some small particles 
of glass therein, and carefully replaced the cap 
while the bottle sat near the vending machine, 
than that such procedure could have been effected 
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after the bottles passed the final inspection at 
the defendant's plant, and before they were de-
livered to the Borden Co. Of course, it is possible 
that the plaintiff herself inserted the glass into 
the bottle after she uncapped it for the purpose 
of attempting to recover damages from the de-
fendant. However, in reviewing hundreds of cases 
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been 
applied in sealed package and bottle beverage 
cases, none has been found \Vhere it was not held 
that it was a question for the jury as to whether 
the plaintiff was the culprit. * * * A comprehen-
sive review of the cases in other jurisdiction' 
upon this question indicates that the views herein 
expressed represent the great weight of author-
ity, although there are eases to the contrary." 
Another case which deals Vi-"'ith sin1ilar principles 
is the case of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
1944, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436. Tlris case involved 
a suit for injuries resulting from an exploding bottle 
of Coca Cola received by a waitress. The plaintiff pro-
duced evidence of the normal handling of bottles and 
that the bottle in question had been received at least 
36 hours before the accident. The court held that res 
ipsa loquitur was applicable stating at Page ±38: 
"l\[an~? authorities state that the happening 
of the accident does not speak for itself where 
it took place smne tune after defendant had re-
linquished control of the instrmnentality causing 
the injurr. Under the n1ore logical \"'iew. how-
ever, the doctrine nw~- be applied upon the theory 
that defendant had control at the time of the al-
le.qcd ne.qligent act, although not at the time of 
the' accidPnt. provided plaintiff first proves that 
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the condition of the instrumentality had not been 
changed after it left the defendant's possession.** 
It is not necessary, of course, that plaintiff 
elemina te every remote possibility of injury to 
the bottle after defendant lost control, and the 
requirmnent is satisfied if there is evidence per-
mitting a reasonable inference that it was not 
accessible to extraneous harmful forces and that 
it was carefully handled by plaintiff or any third 
person who may have moved or touched it. * * * 
If such evidence is presented, the question be-
comes one for the trier of fact, * * *, and, ac-
cordingly, the issue should be submitted to the 
jury under proper instructions." 
A good example of the type of evidence produced to 
make a proper showing is found in the case of Gordon 
v. A.ztec Brewing Co., 1949, 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P. 2d 
522. This case involved an exploding bottle of beer. 
The court in reviewing the evidence stated at Page 524: 
"Tracing the case containing the bottle which 
exploded from the defendant's plant to his hand 
the plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect 
that it suffered no damage at any stage of its 
transportation. The course of cases of ABC beer 
in August of 1944 when the aecident occurred was 
as follows: The cases were loaded on trucks of 
the LaSalle Trucking Company at the defend-
ant's San Diego Plant; LaSalle drivers delivered 
them to a warehouse of the Associated Brewers 
Distributing Company in Los Angeles where they 
remained about three days; on August 22 the 
case which contained the bottle that exploded 
was delivered by an Associated driver to the 
plaintiff. Evidence was presented which showed 
that LaSalle trucks were not involved in accidents 
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during August, 1944; that no accidents occurred 
in the Associated warehouse that month which 
might have affected the beer; that the driver 
who delivered the case to the plaintiff was not 
involved in an accident en route and did not 
bump the case; that it was in excellent condition 
on delivery, and that the plaintiff handled the 
case and the bottle carefully. While this evidencP 
was not conclusive it was the jury's province to 
determine, after being properly instructed. 
whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the 
absence of intervening harmful forces after the 
defendant shipped the bottle to entitle the plain-
tiff to rely on an inference inherent in the do(·-
trine that the defendant's lack of care was the 
proxinmte cause of his injury.'·' 
For an exploding bottle case holding both res ipsn 
loquitur and ilnplied ·warranty proper see n7iclwls 1". 
Nold, 1953, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317. For other 
exploding bottle cases allmving res ipsa loquitur set· 
!Jfayuach ~·. Falstaff Breu:ing CorJJ .. 1949, ________ 2\lo. 
________ , 222 S.\Y. 2d 87; Groves r. Florida Coca Cola Bott-
limg Co., 1949, ________ Fla. --------· 40 So. 2d 1:28; Honea r. 
Coca Cola BottUng Co., 19-±4, 143 Tex. :27:2. 183 S.\Y. 
2d 968; Smitl1 ·r. Coca Cola Bottlinp Co .. 193:2, 91 X. 1-1. 
522, 92 A. 2d 658: Loch v. Confair_. H)33. 3:22 Pa. :n~. 
93 A. 2d ±51; Bornstein c. llfetropolitan BottHng Co .. 
1!)57, -!5 ~ .. T. Super. :-W.\ 1~1:.2 A. :2d 8:25: Dr. PepjJf-'r Bott-
lill_rf eo. of XCirporf L lrhidden, 1956~ -------- Ark --------· 
~!)(; N.\r. ~d -tt2: and Coca Cola Bolf:ling Co. of SoHfh-
ensf Arkan .... ·as 'l'. Jou('s, 1956, -------- Ark. ________ , :293 S.\Y. 
~d :~~1. It lw~ been stated generally in regard to food 
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products cases at Page 122 in Reed Dickerson, "Products 
Liability and the Food Consumer" 1952: 
''It is plain from the reported cases that on 
evidence tending to show causation, without more, 
the plaintiff is entitled at least to go to the jury 
on the issue of negligence. Some courts go farther 
and recognize a presumption of negligence in the 
plaintiff's favor, without, however, shifting the 
burden of proof. Others recognize a presump-
tion and place the burden of proof on the de-
fendant to show that he was careful. * * * In 
each of the categories described, courts can be 
found acting under the auspices of res ipsa 
loquitur." 
There have been other cases where an inference 
of negligence has been allowed without calling it by the 
name of res ipsa loquitur. See Klein v. Duchess Sand-
lcich Co., 1939, 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 and N ock 
r. Coca Cola Bottlting Works of Pittsburgh, 1931, 102 
Pd. Super. 515, 156 A. 537. 
POINT III. 
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF 
BY REASON OF VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STAT-
UTES. 
In Paragraph 6 of his Complaint, plaintiff alleged 
that both defendants violated the statutes of Utah in 
that defendant, Coca Cola Bottling Company, manu-
factured for sale and sold, and defendant, Safeway 
Stores, Inc., sold, a bottle of Coca Cola which was 
adulterated by having in it foreign articles, to-wit: 
paper clips (R 2). 
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It is noted that in 1957, the Utah Legislature en-
acted a Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, being codified as 
Title 4, Chapter 26. It is noted that the pertinent adul-
teration statutes which were formely contained in Chap-
ter 20 of Title 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were 
re-enacted in substance in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act. The pertinent sections in this act are as follows: 
"4-26-3. Prohibited acts. - The following 
acts and the causing thereof within the state of 
Utah are prohibited: 
1. The manufacture, sale, or delivery, hold-
ing or offering for sale of any food, drug, device, 
or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. 
2. The adulteration or misbranding of any 
food, drug, device, or cosmetic. 
3. The receipt in con1merce of any food, 
drug, device, or cosrnetic that is adulterated or 
misbranded, and the delivery or proffered de-
livery thereof for pay or othenvise. * * *" 
"4-26-5. Violation-:Misdemeanor-Defenses 
-Dissemination of advertising.-1. Any person 
who violates any of the provisions of section 
4-26-3 shall be guilty of a misden1eanor. 
2. No person shall be subject to the penal-
ties of subsection 1 of this section. for having 
violated subsections 1 or 3 of section 4-26-3 if he 
establishes a guaranty or undertaking signed by, 
and containing the nmne and address of, the 
person residing in the state of Utah frmn whom 
he received in good faith the article, to the effect 
that such article is not adulterated or rnisbranded 
within the rneaning of this act, designating thi~ 
aet. * * *" 
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"4-26-2. Definitions.-For the purpose of 
this act: 
* * * 3. The term "food" means (1) articles 
used for food or drink for man or other animals, 
(2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for com-
ponents of any such article. * * *" 
"4-26-10. Food-When deemed adulterated. 
-A food shall be deemed to be adulterated: 
1. (1) If it bears or contains any poison-
ous nr d ... leterious substance which may render it 
injurious to health; * * * (3) if it consists in 
whole or in part of a diseased, contaminated, fil-
thy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is 
otherwise unfit for food; * * *. 
2. * * * ( 4) if any substance has been 
added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as 
to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its 
quality or strength or make it appear better or 
of greater value than it is. * * *" 
There should be no question that paper clips in a 
bottle of Coca Cola render the bottle of Coca Cola 
adulterated within the aforesaid statutes. Certainly it 
cannot be argued that said items in a bottle of Coca 
Cola are not foreign added substances and not deleteri-
ous and harmful. If defendants make an issue of this 
in their briefs then plaintiff will furnish additional 
authorities to the court to substantiate this proposition. 
The recent Utah case of Niem.ann v. Grand Central 
Jfarket, Inc., decided by this court on April 3, 1959, 
and found at 9 U. 2d 46, 337 P. 2d 424, should solve 
the contention made on this point. In that case, this 
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court held that a violation of the adulteration statute~ 
of Utah creates absolute liability for damage caused by 
the sale of such food. There can be no question but that 
both defendants come within the terms of the statutes 
in manufacturing and selling the adulterated Coca Cola 
bottle in question. 
From the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint and 
the evidence that plaintiff could offer, certainly a jury 
could find that the bottle of Coca Cola contained the 
paper clips in question while in the possession of both 
defendants. This court well stated the purpose of the 
statutes in question when it stated at Page 428 in the 
Niemann case : 
"The purpose of the statute in question i~ 
clearly the. protection of the public health and 
safety. The accmnplislnnent of that purpose i~ 
of pri1ne ilnportance and n1ust be vigorously 
chan1pioned. The high degree of danger and 
serious consequences latent in the distribution of 
food to the public require the ilnposition of the 
duty anwunting to the creation of the strictest 
liability. Those who undertake such distribution 
1nust be responsible for all dmnage proximately 
caused by the adulteration of their products.'' 
This court cited, as representative of the intent of 
such :::;tatnt0s. the case of Hoefler L .~.Uickle, IS Or. 399. 
] [);~ P. 417. which characterized the statute in question 
as a remedial statute as follows at Page ±20: 
"The statute is re1nedial in its nature, and 
should be construed to effectuate tlw purpose 
intended." 
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lt is anticipated that the only possible defense which 
(•ould be asserted by either of the defendants is the 
asserted defense arising fro1n the Continuing Commodity 
Guaranty which defendant, Safeway Stores, Inc., had 
added to the record as Exhibit "A". Apparently, the 
assertion will be made by Safeway Stores, Inc. that the 
provisions of 4-26-5 Utah Code Annotated will relieve 
said defendant from civil liability as well as criminal 
liabiilty imposed by the adulteration statutes. It will 
he noted that all said statute purports to do is to re-
lieve a violator from criminal punishment. It is sub-
mitted that Section 4-26-3, Utah Code Annotated in 
strict language prohibits the sale of adulterated food. 
In the light of the purpose of these statutes, together 
with the fact that these statutes are remedial and are 
for the protection of the public, it is submitted that the 
fact that Safeway &;res has o"l&ined such an agreement 
fr01n the bottling company cannot obviate the command 
of the statute and affect the rights of innocent members 
of the public purchasing such adulterated articles. 
There is a line of cases dealing with si1nilar conten-
tions w·here it has been held that whether or not the vio-
lator could be punished under the penal provisions of 
the statute was i1nmaterial as to the enforcement of the 
rights given to members of the public by said statutes. 
The general theory behind this reasoning is the fact that 
duty and right are correlative terms, and where a duty 
is imposed, there must be a right to have it performed. 
The case of CUnkscales, et al v. Carver, 1943, 22 Cal. 
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2d 72, 136 P. 2d 777, was a death action resulting from 
an intersection collision. In that case there was a stop 
sign involved which had been erected without official 
authorization. Defendant did not stop at the stop sign. 
The trial court instructed the jury to the effect that if 
defendant failed to stop at this sign and the failure was 
the proximate cause of the accident, the verdict should be 
for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that this was 
proper in the face of the contention made by defendant 
that there could be no criminal responsibility for a per-
son failing to stop at this sign and stated at Page 778: 
I 
"Even if the conduct cannot be punished 
criminally because of irregularities in the adop-
tion of the prohibitory provisions, the legislative 
standard may nevertheless appl:T if it is an ap-
propriate measure for the defendant's conduct. 
When the court accepts the standard it rules in 
effect that defendant's conduct falls below that 
of a reasonable man as the court conceives it. 
It does no more than it does in any ruling that cer-
tain acts or omissions a1nount as a matter of law to 
negligence. Restatement: Torts, sec. 285. * * * 
Failure to observe a stop-sign is unreasonably 
dangerous conduct whether or not the driver is 
in1mune frmn cri1ninal prosecution because of 
so1ne irregularity in the erection of the stop-sign.'' 
The California eourt cited the \Yashington case of 
Comfort -c. Penner, 166 \Yash. 171. 6 P. ~d 60-±. 
The ea~e of Pouca City v. Reed, 115 Okla. 166, 2-1:2 
P. 1G4, was a wrongful death aetion arising from the 
electroeution of decedent ·while working for the city as 
an el<"etrieian. The plaintiff alleged that the city was 
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negligent in failing to furnish a safe place to work and 
introduced into evidence city ordinances establishing 
regulations for the heighth of wire above buildings and 
so forth. The appellate court held that, although thl3 
criminal penalty was unenforceable, the ordinance was 
admissable to show that the city had declared rules of 
safety for its inhabitants in general and that it had 
failed to comply with these rules at the place where de-
cedent was required to work. 
Another case dealing with the same general problem 
is the case of West Texas Coaches Inc. v. Madi, Tex. 
Comm. App. 1930, 26 S.W. 2d 199. This case arose from 
an automobile accident. One of the issues submitted to 
the jury was whether or not the defendant drove at such 
a speed as to endanger the life of persons on the high-
way. This issue was answered "yes" by the jury, and. 
on appeal, the defendant complained that this issue was 
presented in the language of a penal statute which was 
vague and unenforceable. The court held that the statute, 
so far as it imposes a rule on civil conduct, is not void 
for uncertainty, citing the case of Solan & Billings v. 
Pasche, Texas, 153 S.W. 672, where the court instructed 
that the violation of the statute in question was negli-
gence per se. The court stated at Page 674 in the Pasche 
case: 
"It is objected that the section of the law 
quoted is unconstitutional and cannot be enforced 
as a penal statute, because it is so vague and in-
definite that it is not susceptible of enforcement 
as such. It is unnecessary to determine whether 
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or not the statute is subject to the particular ob-
jection urged, as it was at least sufficient as a 
remedial statttte imposing a civil duty so as to 
render its violation negligence per se." 
The court also cited 42 C.J. 631 and Stri'Ckland 'V. Whal-
ley, Ga., 83 S.E. 856. 
An early New York case dealt with the same problem 
in regard to an ordinance requiring fire escapes. Thi:-: 
was found in the case of Willy, Adm. 'l". Mulledy, Court of 
Appeals, N.Y. 1879, 78 N.Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536. Thi~ 
was a death action caused by alleged negligence of de-
fendant in failing to furnish a fire escape for an apart-
ment which defendant rented to plaintiff. The Charter of 
Brooklyn iinposed an absolute duty on owners of tene-
ment houses to provide fire escapes. The Charter also 
provided that persons failing to erect such fire escapes 
after being notified by commissioners shall be guity 
of a n1isderneanor. The defendant elaiined, ainong other 
things, that he had never been notified by the ~commis­
sioners. The court held that the defendant was not per-
rnitted to wait until notified~ that the breach of thll 
statute gave rise to a civil cause of action. 
At Page 314 the court stated: 
"Duty and right are correlative~ and where a 
duty is iinposed, there n1ust be a right to have it 
performed." 
Other ca~r~ in which the smue general problem ha~ 
hrrn dealt with similarly are: llopki·Jl$ r. Droppers, 192·:1:. 
1S-~ \Vi~. 4-00, 19S K.\Y. '/i)S, where the rourt held a 
father respon:.; ihle for lwing negligent a~ n matter of 
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law for allowing his son, who was under the age of 16 
years, to drive a motorcycle, where the statute in question 
merely imposed the penalty on the boy under 16 years of 
age and imposed no penalty on the father; and Lewvs v. 
City of Miami, 1937, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150, where 
a municipality was held responsible in negligence for 
failing to segregate prisoners in the city jail and in allow-
ing plaintiff to be exposed to a venereal disease. The 
court in this case did not attempt to overrule the doctrine 
of governmental immunity but based its ruling on the 
violation of the statute dealing with protecting indi-
viduals from exposure to loathesome diseases. 
It is submitted that the foregoing authorities clear-
ly establish that such statutes as the ones in question 
in this case have both civil and criminal sanctions. The 
mere fact that for some reason the criminal punishment 
cannot be imposed certainly does not and should not 
relieve a person from complying with the commands of 
the statutes in regard to the protection of the public at 
large. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in this appeal boils down to the simple 
proposition of whether or not the buying public will be 
protected for injuries resulting from purchasing adulter-
ated food or drink. The buying public must, of necessity, 
rely on the manufacturers and retailers for furnishing 
wholesome food, and, in this regard, the buying public 
is at the mercy of the persons who are making profits 
from selling such food and drink. This court is well 
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aware of the public policy which demands that such pro~ 
tection be afforded, as was well stated in its opinion in 
the Niemann case. It is submitted that the case at bar 
is a typical case arising from the purchase of a sealed 
bottle or can and injury resulting from adulterated food 
therein. 
The plaintiff's evidence can well justify a finding by 
the jury that the paper clips were in the Coca Cola bottle 
when he purchased it from defendant, Safeway Stores, 
Inc., and that the paper clips were in the bottle \Yhile in 
the possession and control of defendant, Coca Cola Bot-
tling Company. In such a situation the rights of the 
parties should be spelled out and made clear so that all 
parties are made aware of their rights and duties. The 
action in question was brought on the grounds of breach 
of in1plied warranty, res ipsa loquitur and breach of 
statutory duty in order to present all possible theories 
to the court. Inasn1uch as this is the first tune in this 
state that all possible theories have been presented 
against all possible defendants on a typical case of food 
product~ liability. this court has an excellent opportunity 
to settle the law once and for all in the State of l)tah on 
this subject. 
It i~ submitted that under the better reasoned and 
tllOd<'rn t rPnd of authority plaintiff is entitled to recover 
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against both defendants on all three counts and at the 
very least on one or more. For this reason, this court 
is urged to reverse the dis1nissals made by the trial court 
and to remand this case for trial in accordance with a 
clear pronouncement of law by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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